




DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 




















Working Paper No. 10/16 
May 2010 






effect of constitution type on government size, it addresses the concerns of Ace-
moglu(2005) and makes some further reﬁnements to argue that there is a qual-
itatively large, and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between constitution type
and government size. The age of a democracy is of increased importance in the
new identiﬁcationstrategy, but existing measures areshown to be ﬂawed. Two new
measuresoftheageofademocracyareintroduced. Theﬁrstdetailswhenacountry
ﬁrst had a genuinely democratic election, the second when its current constitution
was promulgated.
james.rockey@le.ac.uk., I thank Jonathan Temple for many helpful discussions and Simon Johnson,
Torsten Persson, and Stefan Voigt for making their datasets available. The usual disclaimer applies.1
Introduction
Constitutions vary: the US constitution is a classic of political philosophy, whilst the
UK has no formal constitution. Yet, constitutions tend to vary little over time. In
many cases the decisions made when drawing up a constitution as to the separation
of powers or the rights of individuals echo down the centuries. This paper revisits the
question of whether these echoes include macroeconomic outcomes, speciﬁcally the
size of government, and argues that they indeed do.
Thestudyofconstitutionsbothnormativeandpositivehasalonganddistinguished
history. Formal analyses are a more recent addition to the literature and two key
contributions are those of Persson et al. (1997, 2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
Generally speaking, their models suggest that countries which have a presidential
system, or a ﬁrst past the post electoral system are likely to have smaller governments.
Thispaperconsidersthepreviousempiricalevidenceforthishypothesisandaddresses
someimportantconcernsaboutthemethodologyandsomeofthedatausedtoprovide
new support for their ﬁndings.
Persson and Tabellini (2003) (henceforth PT) was a major step forward in the
empirical analysis of the relationships between constitutional type and government
size. They provide evidence that presidential systems have a large, negative, and
statisticallysigniﬁcantimpactonthesizeofcentralgovernment. Theyalsosuggestthat
ﬁrstpastthepostelectoralsystemsarealsoassociatedwithasmallergovernmentshare
of output, but the evidence is weaker for this hypothesis. PT treat a country’s choice of
constitution as possibly endogenous and use instruments premised on the idea that
historical timing of democratisation and the degree of European inﬂuence are good
predictors of constitutional type. These instruments will be seen to be problematic but
using new instruments, and alternative, improved, estimation methods this paper ar-
guesthatthereisindeedaquantitativelylargenegativeeffectofpresidentialdemocracy
on the average size of government.
Thispaperwillfocusonchapter6ofPT,whichoverlapstosomedegreewithPersson
and Tabellini (2004). Both provide evidence that countries with proportional electoral
systems are expected to have more central government expenditure as a proportion
of output, and a fortiori that Presidential democracies are associated with a smaller2
government. The key criticisms of Acemoglu (2005) will be considered and addressed.
Furthermore, new data will be described which attempt to date more accurately when
a country ﬁrst permanently became a democracy. This is motivated by some notable
discrepancies in the existing data and also due to the demonstrated relevance of the
age of democracy as an instrument for constitutional type. More generally, both of
these objectives gain impetus from the importance of the contribution made by PT.
Acemoglu writes that:
”[...] I believe that overall PT have largely achieved their ambitious aim of
revolutionizing comparative political economy, and this book is the most
signiﬁcantcontributiontothisﬁeldsinceLipset’sworkalmost50yearsago”.
Only time will tell if this is true, but on the available evidence it would be churlish to
rule it out. Establishing causality is often difﬁcult in social science, and in few cases
more so than in any attempt to disentangle the complex web of institutions, social
mores, and ideology that contribute to determining the size of the state. Yet, efforts
to establish a genuinely meaningful, understanding of constitutions and their effects,
require consideration of causal effects. Consequently, the focus of this paper are issues
of causal identiﬁcation.
Not surprisingly given the complexity of the task, PT’s attempts to do so suffer
from several problems. They pursue an instrumental variables approach (IV), but
Acemoglucriticizesboththeestimationmethod,andalsotherelevanceoftheexcluded
instruments. This paper will address Acemoglu’s criticisms and show that by using an
improved methodology and more suitable instruments that it is possible to provide
additional evidence for a causal relationship.
Thispaperproceedsasfollows. InthenextsectionPT’ssetofinstrumentalvariables
willbeoutlined, aswillAcemoglu’scritiqueoftheirrelevance. Thiswillbefollowedbya
discussion of the motivation for the new instruments used. The second part of section
two will provide a brief overview of the evidence as to the relative merits of different
estimation strategies, and in particular the advantages of using Limited Information
Maximum Likelihood (LIML) based estimators rather than Two-Stage Least Squares
(2SLS). The third section discusses some of the new data used, and in particular the
relevance of the excluded instruments. Section four provides evidence that using LIML3
based methods, and a different set of instrumental variables, that the criticisms of the
estimation approach and instruments can, to a large extent, be overcome. Estimates
are obtained using both the original dataset of PT and also the extended dataset of
Blume, M¨ oller, Voigt and Wolf (2009). Contrary to the general message of their paper,
the IV estimates suggest that even when using their expanded dataset, there is still a
large negative impact of presidentialism on government spending, and little evidence
of an effect associated with the type of electoral system. Section four also reviews the
results using alternative estimates of the age of democracies. Results obtained using
the new data lend additional support to the claims of PT. Section ﬁve concludes.
1. PT’s estimation strategy and its problems
1.1. The choice of instruments
This section shall only brieﬂy outline the parts of PT that focus on the effect of
presidentialism and majoritarian electoral rule on ﬁscal policy. Here PT aim to test
the empirical validity of theoretical work outlined in their previous book, Persson and
Tabellini (2000), which makes two central claims.
Firstly, it suggests that nations with majoritarian elections will have a smaller
government than those with proportional representation. The theoretical logic for this,
developed in Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000), is founded upon models in which
thelargerelectoraldistrictsassociatedwithproportionalrepresentationmakeelectoral
competition more diffuse instead of being focused in a few marginal districts. This
meansthatsupport requiresgovernmenttransferstoa largerswatheofthe population,
thereby increasing government spending.
Secondly, as ﬁrst discussed in Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) it is posited
that presidential systems will have lower government spending than parliamentary
systems, as the implied separation of powers prevents politicians from colluding in
extracting rents and hence makes them more accountable. 1
1There are several other important approaches, such as that of Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno
(2002) present and empirically test a model in which, under proportional representation, voters have
an incentive to elect politicians more prone to public good provision. Besley and Case (2003) consider
variation in electoral rules across US state legislatures, emphasising the importance of more-subtle
variations in state constitutions.4
In the regressions of interest, in PT, the dependent variable is central government
expenditure as a percentage of GDP , cgexp. Using data on around 80 democracies, PT
consider whether ceteris paribus the type of constitution a country has is responsible
for, in part, determining the size of government. However, it is potentially the case that
a country’s choice of constitution is partly endogenous, driven by national preferences
that also partially determine the level of government expenditure. Evaluating the
effects of constitutions on government spending under the assumption of random
constitutional assignment will result in severely biased estimates and prohibit causal
inference. PT take these concerns seriously and as Persson (2004) notes, they
“exploit systematic co-variation between the relative frequency of alterna-
tive constitutional rules and their broad time period of introduction”.
As discussed above this is done using the variables describing the age of democra-
ciesasinstruments. Section3considerssomepotentialweaknessesintheconstruction
of these measures and proposes two alternatives. The ﬁrst part of this section focuses
on the choice of the other instruments used, and the second part considers some
potential problems with the estimators used. In particular, it considers PT’s 2SLS
analysis. PT consider a range of other econometric techniques to circumvent the prob-
lems of endogeneity, speciﬁcally Heckman selection-correction models and matching
estimators. However, here the focus is restricted to the 2SLS estimates since this
approach has garnered most attention, and also allows both of the PT constitutional
variables to be treated as endogenous simultaneously. PT instrument for whether a
country’s electoral system is majoritarian or not, and whether it has a presidential
system. The extent to which they do so successfully is the focus of the following
discussion. Of course, the approach taken here could be readily adapted for other
related questions.
Binary variables denoted maj and pres are deﬁned based upon these criteria: a
country is considered to be majoritarian (maj=1) if elections to the national legislature
(or the lower chamber in a multi-cameral system) are conducted using exclusively
a plurality rule, that is, each constituency elects the single candidate who gains the
highest proportion of the vote. Similarly, a country is considered to be a presidential
democracy(pres=1)iftheexecutiveisindependentofthelegislature,thatis,notsubject5
to a conﬁdence vote.
Both are instrumented for using the same seven variables, four describing when a
country became a democracy, and three variables describing colonial inﬂuence. The
age of a democracy is measured using the variable age and three binary variables
con2150, con5180, con81. The inclusion of variable describing the age of democracies
is premised on the idea that when a constitution was written is a plausible predictor
of its type, since as PT note there have been changes in ‘constitutional fashion’ over
time. Thesevariablesareconstructedbaseduponthevariabledemage whichdescribes
how long a country has been a democracy. demage is deﬁned by the start of a
continuous set of positive polity values excluding any interruptions due to foreign
occupation. The polity variable records the difference between the score given by
the Polity IV database for the extent of institutionalized autocracy and the degree
of institutionalized democracy with a score between of –10 (very autocratic) to +10
(very democratic). age is deﬁned as 2000-demage. As is argued in Section 2. this
is likely to be an imperfect measure of the age of a democracy, despite its virtue of
objectivity. The variables con2150, con5180, con81 are indicator variables based on
demage which describe whether the current constitution was promulgated between
1921 and 1950, 1951-1980 or post-1981 with 1920 or earlier the omitted category. To
capture colonial inﬂuence PT use the variables Engfrac, Eurfrac and Lat01 based upon
the work of Hall and Jones (1999) and (more loosely) Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2001).Lat01 describes distance from the equator. Engfrac describes the proportion
of the population speaking English as a ﬁrst language, Eurfrac is the same but for the
major European languages.
However, Acemoglu (2005) argues that this instrument set is unsatisfactory, in
particular that some of the instruments are not excludable, and that the others are
weak. He argues that this is the case for two main reasons. Firstly, that Hall and Jones
(1999) use the variables Engfrac, Eurfrac, and lat01 as a measure of Western colonial
inﬂuence. They argue that countries further from the equator are more likely to have
climates similar to those encountered in Europe and were therefore more appealing to
European settlers. Similarly, those countries with a high percentage of speakers of a
European language can be reasonably expected to have experienced more European
inﬂuence. Hall and Jones (1999) argued that these measures of Western inﬂuence6
were a good instrument for the presence of good legal and/or democratic institutions
(”social infrastructure”).
But, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) argue that the nature of coloniza-
tion was related to the environment encountered in the area being colonized more
speciﬁcally than can be described by latitude. That is, in countries where colonists
encountered adverse conditions (high rates of settler mortality) large scale settlement
was unlikely, and this led to absolutist regimes focused on extractive activities, often
employing forced labour and with no system of property rights. In colonies where
mortality rates were lower, larger settlements were more likely and these settlers
demanded, and in general got, institutions similar to those in their home country. For
example, contrast the Belgian Congo with Australia or New Zealand. Hence, whether
theEuropeancolonizationwasbeneﬁcialtoaparticularcountryisdependentuponthe
natureofthecolonialprocessandassuch, althoughtheHallandJonesinstrumentsare
correlated with settler mortality rates, the instruments cannot be seen to be related to
beneﬁcial Western inﬂuence in the form of high quality institutions.
Secondly, the Hall and Jones instruments, even if they described the extent of Euro-
pean inﬂuence, would not be able to explain the variation in the forms of democracy
which PT wish to instrument. Since a large proportion of the sample are themselves
European democracies, or were not colonized at all, we should not expect the Hall
and Jones instruments to be informative for these. If they are not informative about
countries that weren’t colonized or were themselves colonial powers then there is no
reason to expect that the instruments are relevant for these countries and hence in
general are not useful instruments.
Perhaps more importantly, even if they are good instruments for the quality or
presence of democratic institutions they cannot explain why certain countries have
adopted particular democratic institutions. Acemoglu provides an extremely thorough
treatment of the pitfalls of IV estimation in his paper, and inter alia, demonstrates
that if instruments that are related to a “cluster of institutions” are used to predict a
speciﬁc institution then the effect of all the other, ignored, institutions is included in
the effect for the speciﬁc institution of interest. Hence, it is clear that using the Hall
and Jones instruments are not appropriate for the speciﬁc features of democracies.
Unfortunately, the other instruments PT use, the measures of democratic age, have7
little explanatory power on their own. This means there is (potentially) a weak-
instruments problem, if only they are used. The problem of weak instruments will be
discussed in more detail in the next section.
The remainder of this section will now consider some alternative instruments.
An obvious approach is to include age2 as well as age since there is no reason to
think that the variations in ‘constitutional fashion’ have occurred linearly.2 The other
instruments that will be considered relate to countries’ colonial experiences as well as
some describing the antiquity of states and societies.




is anecdotal evidence of direct inﬂuence. More generally, there are several different
butrelated indirectreasons whycertain colonial powersmight haveinduced particular
constitutional rules. European colonization can be broadly conceived as having taken
place in two phases. The ﬁrst roughly coincides with the discovery of the Americas
and the subsequent colonization. What is clear for this, early, process of colonization
is that the different colonial nations had different objectives. The focus of Spanish
and Portuguese colonialists was the extraction of mineral wealth and the conversion
of indigenous peoples to Catholicism. See for example, Olsson (2004)
ThisnecessarilyengendereddifferentinstitutionstothoseintheBritish,Dutch,and
French colonies, which were focused on more permanent settlement and trade. This is
not a claim that there was not both substantial rent extraction by the British, Dutch, or
French colonists and attempts by them to spread Christianity amongst the indigenous
peoples. Indeed, much of the economic logic of British colonies was founded on
obtaining slaves in West Africa for exploitation in plantations in North America and the
Caribbean. Rather, the different, more permanent, emphasis of this colonial activity
necessarily led to different institutions.
The second phase of colonization coincided with the colonization of parts of Africa
2This has the advantage compared to con2150, etc. of not needing to assume when the key changes
in constitutional fashion took place. A cubic term was considered but added little additional explanatory
power. Using the ﬁrst-stage F-statistics designed to identify potential weak identiﬁcation suggested by
Angrist and Pischke (2009) suggests that using age2 rather than con2150, etc., and the remainder of PT’s
original excluded instrument set, improves the identiﬁcation of both equations.8
and Asia, culminating in the ‘Race for Africa’, following which almost all of the African
continent, alongside large amounts of Asia, was ruled by a European power by the
outbreak of the First World War. A notable feature of this wave of colonization in
comparisontotheﬁrstphasewasthatFranceandtheUKwerepre-eminent,incontrast
to the earlier importance of Spain and Portugal. Also, there was the growth of what
might be termed “settled colonies” such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. This
is not to deny the presence of the pre-existing populations of these countries, rather to
emphasize the large numbers of Europeans who migrated to them.
This variation between the incentives and methods pursued by the different coun-
tries at different times is interesting, since the process of decolonization also differed
not only between different colonialists but also across time. The peaceful way in which
Brazil obtained its independence from Portugal stands in stark contrast to the violent
wars of liberation fought in the countries that are now Bolivia and Venezuela, and in
general across the rest of South America. Similarly, the struggle for independence in
Algeria stands in stark relief to that of the comparatively peaceful transitions in many
other French colonies. It is not the purpose of this paper to provide an account of the
different paths to independence of the myriad different colonies, nor to delineate the
reasons for this variation.
The argument instead is that countries are likely to have inherited political systems
similar to those in the occupying colonial power, and that this tendency is expected to
be more pronounced in countries where there was not a large-scale war of liberation.
The argument about colonial inﬂuence is far from new, see for example, La Porta,
Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), and Hall and Jones (1999). Moreover,
thosecountrieswhichdidhavetoﬁghtfortheirindependencemightwellbeinﬂuenced
by the form of the broader societal institutions the colonialists had put in place. For
example, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)
argue that high levels of inequality are likely to engender more political instability and
that this is due to the importance of small elites. Furthermore, countries with great
mineral wealth are more likely to exhibit high degrees of inequality (see Leamer, Maul,
Rodriguez and Schott (1999)) mainly due to large rents that are concentrated amongst
a small elite as suggested by Jensen and Wantchekon (2004). This is even more likely in
countries in which colonialists or pre-existing elites used forced labour. These results9
takentogethersuggestthatifcountrieshavehigherdegreesofinequality,theyaremore
likely to have majoritarian regimes.
To try and capture the variety of colonial experiences, variables were included
describing whether a country was colonized by the UK (coluka), Spain ( colespa), or
another country (colotha), having been colonized by France was the omitted category.
Also included were whether a country was colonized at some point which is described
by excolony3 and the percentage of the population who were Catholic in 1980 is also
included(catho80).4
In sum, it is argued that these alternative instruments are not vulnerable to the
same criticisms that Acemoglu made of the Hall and Jones (1999) instruments. As a
set of instruments they explicitly consider the different inﬂuences of different colonial
powers, the degree of susceptibility of a country to these inﬂuences, and via age and
age2, theimpactofconstitutional“fashion”onthosecountriesthatwerenotcolonized.
Moreover, unliketheanalysisinHallandJones(1999)theyareconcernedwiththeform
of government rather than with the existence of high or low quality institutions.
1.2. Persson and Tabellini’s Methodology
In small samples the conventional challenges associated with instrumental variables
approaches,identifyingrelevantandexcludableinstruments,areheightenedbyrelated
concerns about the number of regressors compared to the number of observations
and that particular observations may be driving the results. By instrumenting using
a set of variables measuring the age of a democracy, as well as distance from the
equator and the proportion of the population speaking English or another European
language, PT hope that the residual variation in constitutional choice is random (i.e.
that there is selection on observables). As mentioned above, following this method,
they obtain estimates which suggest that a presidential system is associated with
smallergovernmentandaproportionalelectoralsystemisassociatedwithalargerone.
The dependent variable in the second stage regression is cgexp, which is regressed
3From Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001)
4Whilst catho80 cannot be seen as being predetermined and hence plausibly exogenous, it is claimed
thatnon-EuropeancountrieswithlargeCatholicpopulationsingeneralwereconvertedpriortobecoming
democracies. Hence,itisbelievedthataswellasbeingagoodindicatorofareligiousfocustocolonization,
it is plausibly exogenous.10
upon maj, pres, age, lyp (log income per capita - richer countries may have larger
governments)trade (opennessdeﬁnedbytheshareofimportsandexportsasashareof
GDP , as Rodrik (1998) argues more open economies tend to have bigger governments),
prop1564 and prop65 (the proportions of the population between the ages of 15 and
64 and the proportion 65 or older, an higher dependency ratio is often associated with
larger government). 5
Due to concerns about sample size and weak instruments (discussed below) PT
do not include all of the exogenous variables in the ﬁrst stage. As well as his critique
of the relevance and validity of the actual instruments used, Acemoglu (2005) also
presents a theoretical critique of this approach. His theoretical criticisms deserve
careful consideration not least since they motivate some of the suggestions below.
Givenitsimportanceforthefollowingdiscussionitisworthformallyoutliningthebasic
instrumental variable (IV) estimator for a single endogenous variable, which can be
stated as follows:
A conventional OLS estimator might be applied to:
Y = X1 + X2 + u (1)
However if Cov(X1;u) 6= 0 then OLS is inconsistent. But assume that a variable Z
can be found such that Cov(Z;u) = 0 and Cov(Z;X1) 6= 0. Then the model can be
written as follows:
Y = X1 + X2 + u (2)
X1 = Z + X2 + v (3)
Where Y is a N 1 vector containing the dependent variable, X1 is the N 1 vector
describing the endogenous variable. X2 is an N  K matrix of exogenous variables. Z
5The other right-hand side variables are gastil is the average of Freedom House’s index of civil and
political rights measured on a 1-7 scale (the form of democracy may matter more in better functioning
democracies) . Finally indicator variables are included for whether a country has a federal government
(federal since central government spending might be expected to be lower in federal systems), or is a
member of the OECD (oecd, for similar reasons to lyp). These variables and the others used in this paper
are summarized in Table 1. The logic for the choice of controls is explained more thoroughly by PT(pp39-
43).11
is an N  K matrix containing the set of instruments for X1. Then the IV estimator is:
b IV = (Z0X) 1Z0Y (4)
PT for the reasons mentioned above use something closer to the following estima-
tor:6
Y = X1 + X2 + u (5)
X1 = Z + v (6)
This estimator is only consistent if Cov(Z;u) = Cov(Z;u j X2) = 0 whereas the
conventional IV estimator only requires that Cov(Z;u) = 0: Abstracting from theory
it is unlikely to ﬁnd a variable which meets the conditions that it is both sufﬁciently
correlated with the endogenous variable and unconditionally independent of the error
term. Thus, unless X2 has no explanatory power for X1 then Cov(Z;u)  Cov(Z;u j
X2)  0. Hence, the estimates are likely to be inconsistent. For this reason this paper
uses an alternative approach.
But, PT’s concerns about weak instruments are likely to be well founded and
thereforeitislogicaltoconsiderestimatorsthatperformbetterifinstrumentsareweak,
rather than simply to use conventional 2SLS or to disregard the results entirely. The
remainder of this section shall now consider alternative estimators such as LIML, and
their relative advantages and disadvantages.
An instrument is said to be weak when Cov(X1;Z) is low or alternatively   0.
Hahn and Hausman (2003) state that weak instruments mean that
“ (i) 2SLS is badly biased toward the OLS estimate and alternative “un-
biased” estimators such as LIML may not solve the problem and (ii) the
standard (ﬁrst order) asymptotic distribution does not give an accurate
framework for inference.”
There has been a large recent literature on the problem of weak instruments,
and in particular testing for whether instruments are weak and the performance of
6It should be noted that PT(p164) acknowledge the assumption made, and suggest (as reported below)
that the estimates are stronger when the included instruments are included.12
different estimators under these conditions. Here, the analysis will be restricted to the
speciﬁc case of PT’s estimates but for more general and detailed analyses see Angrist,
Imbens and Krueger (1999), Blomquist and Dahlberg (1999), Hahn and Hausman
(2003), Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) Honor´ e and Hu (2004). The main conclusions
ofthisliteratureseemtobetwo-fold. Firstly, that2SLSperformsparticularlybadlywith
weak instruments, and that estimators without ﬁnite moments such as LIML, Jackknife
Instrumental Variables (JIVE) or the Nagar estimator are potentially problematic in
ﬁnitesamples. Consequently,HahnandHausman(2003)advocatetheuseofeitherthe
Fuller(1977)modiﬁedLIMLestimatorsorjackknife2SLSestimation.7 Fuller’smodiﬁed
LIML estimator has ﬁnite sample moments but requires the researcher to specify a
constant b. Conventionally, b is either given a value of 1 or 4. If b is equal to 1 then
the estimator is mean-unbiased, a choice of 4 provides an estimator that minimizes
the mean squared error. The focus here is on these Fuller estimators since they are
more readily implementable, and Hahn and Hausman (2003) results from Monte Carlo
simulationssuggestthatFuller(4)isexpectedtobethebestperformingestimatorgiven
the sample size, and ﬁrst-stage R2s:
Given that this paper is, in part, concerned with robustness two further estimators
wereconsidered. TheﬁrstoftheseistheContinuouslyUpdatingGMMestimator(CUE)
ﬁrst proposed by Hansen, Heaton and Yaron (1996). This estimator can be thought
of as generalization of LIML to the case of non-spherical disturbances analogous to
the relationship between 2SLS and GMM. It’s also a special case of the Generalized
Empirical Likelihood (GEL) estimator. 8 In this respect, as discussed by Smith (2005)
it’s asymptotic bias is expected to be less than that of any (feasible) GMM estimator,
7It is important to note that JIVE and jackknifed 2SLS are different. Both are designed to address the
bias of 2SLS in small samples. This bias, due to the correlation of u and v, becomes larger as the number
of instruments increases for a given sample size. JIVE as proposed by Angrist, Imbens and Krueger





JIV EY ) where ^ XJIV E are predicted values of the endogenous
regressors obtained using the jackknife to construct instruments orthogonal to the error term in ﬁnite
samples. Hence, making the correlation between u and v zero and eliminating the bias. However, JIVE
lacksﬁnitesamplemomentsandMonteCarlosimulationssuggestthatitperformsbadlyinsmallsamples.
Jackknife 2SLS as described by Hahn, Hausman and Kuersteiner (2004) uses the jackknife to estimate the
bias of the 2SLS estimate and subtracts this from the 2SLS estimate. The advantage of this approach is
that as the estimated bias of the 2SLS estimate is a combination of N 2SLS estimates the estimator has
ﬁnite moments if the degree of over-identiﬁcation (the difference in the rank of Z and X) is greater than
2.
8Alternatively, it can be seen as in Hansen, Heaton and Yaron (1996) as a GMM estimator where the
objective function is minimized for the parameter vector in both the expected moments and the weight
matrix. .13
and importantly it is efﬁcient in the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity unlike
the Fuller estimators. However, the ﬁnite-sample properties are more ambiguous.
Guggenberger (2008) notes that it is difﬁcult to analytically establish whether GEL
estimators possess ﬁnite-sample moments, but using a Monte-Carlo analysis suggests
that the ﬁnite sample properties of GEL, including CUE, are similar to LIML. That is,
as discussed above, they suffer a moment problem. Speciﬁcally, he shows that the
probabilityofanextremeestimate,andthestandarddeviationoftheestimatesismuch
higher for both GEL estimators and LIML. On this basis, he argues that GEL estimators
shouldn’t be used for the linear IV model. However, the lack of an efﬁcient alternative
in the presence of heteroskedasticity suggests a compromise of reporting the CUE
estimates in tandem the Fuller estimates. Given neither estimator is entirely suitable.9
Another consequence of weak instruments, other than biased estimates, is that
the size of the tests on coefﬁcients in ﬁnite samples may differ arbitrarily from their
asymptotic size. Moreira (2003) proposes a score (LR) test that is of the correct size,
even when instruments are arbitrarily weak. However, it is only derived for the case of
a single endogenous variable, whereas PT’s setup has two (Pres and Maj). Applying the
Moreira (2003) approach to the endogenous variables in turn supports the hypothesis
that Pres is signiﬁcant and negative, and Maj is not at all signiﬁcant.10
In summary, Acemoglu’s two central criticisms of PT’s approach have been ad-
dressed. The new instruments proposed are both more likely to be relevant and
excludable, and by using alternative estimators concerns about weak instruments are
reduced. The next section considers some potential ﬂaws in PT’s measure of the age of
democracies.
2. The age of democracies
Given that the age of democracies is central to the instrument set proposed in the
previous section, and to the original approach of PT, it is worth considering how
9Estimates for both the Fuller and CUE estimators were obtained using the IVREG2 package for STATA
provided by Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2002)
10The particular speciﬁcation employed is to include the other endogenous variable, pres or maj, as an
exogenous predictor. The estimates were obtained using the CONDIVREG package of Mikusheva and Poi
(2006).14
accurately it has been measured.11 As described in section 2.1 PT’s measure demage
recordswhenthestartofacontinuousstringofpositivepolity scoresoccurred. Acasual
inspection of demage immediately reveals some potential weaknesses. The most
obvious of these is South Africa, which as described in Appendix B, is dated as having
been a democracy since 1910. A country in which the majority of the population are
precludedfromvotingonethnicgroundsisclearlynotademocracyinanymeaningful,
modern, sense.
Japan is another interesting example. The PT variable demage records that it
became a democracy in 1868. However, universal suffrage was only introduced in
1925 and individual and political freedoms were still limited by the “Peace Preservation
Law” that followed shortly afterwards. More importantly, this transition to democracy
was reversed during the 1930s as the military and nationalists seized effective control
ofthecountryandassassinatedleadingcivilianpoliticians. AftertheendoftheSecond
World War a very different democratic constitution was introduced that was avowedly
paciﬁstic and which reduced the role of the emperor to a ﬁgurehead. That throughout
the 1930s and 1940s the polityiv measure still records positive values suggests that this
method of dating democracies leaves much to be desired. There are other examples,
including the USA, South Africa, and Costa Rica, where the age of a democracy, as
measured by age, would seem to be measured with error, and these are described in
the Web Appendix .
It has often been the case that the transition to democracy from autocracy has been
a gradual evolution, particularly in countries that have not been colonized or involved
in major conﬂicts. At which point a country should be seen as fully democratic is often
moredifﬁculttojudgeinthesecasesasdefacto changesaresometimesasimportantas
dejure changes. ConsiderthecaseofSweden,whichPTrecordsbaseduponthepolityiv
data, as having been a democracy since 1917. A crucial point in the development of
Swedish democracy was the passing of the “Instrument of Government” in 1809 which
divided power between the monarch and “Riksdag of the Estates” which represented
the four Swedish social groups. This was replaced by a bicameral parliament in
1866 and universal male suffrage was formally introduced in 1907 and was followed
11Although, Acemoglu (2005) notes that it is the other variables lat01, engfrac, and eurfrac, that have the
majority of the explanatory power in the ﬁrst stage.15
closely by universal suffrage in 1921. However, whilst increasingly the King’s role was
merely a formality, it was not until the constitution of 1975 that his constitutional role
was reduced to head of state. Hence, in some respects Sweden can be seen to have
been a democracy since 1907; alternatively it could be considered as having become
a democracy when the ﬁrst elections with universal male suffrage took place in 1911,
or the ﬁrst with universal suffrage in 1921. It is clear that Sweden was a democracy in
a meaningful sense before 1975 but in other countries the introduction of a genuinely
democratic constitution has been a necessary, if not always sufﬁcient, condition for
democracy.
Hence,giventhedisadvantagesofusingage asameasureoftheageofdemocracies,
and its importance in PT’s analysis, a strong case can be made for considering some
other measures. However, there is an absence of readily available alternatives to age.
Moreover, the often great variations between when a country became a democracy
de jure, and when it was in fact a de facto democracy motivated a collation of two
new variables describing the dates of a country’s ﬁrst democratic election, and the
promulgationofitsﬁrstdemocraticconstitution. Thesetwonewvariables,constructed
by the author, will be denoted dateelections and dateconstitution.
The new measures were constructed using primarily the International Constitu-
tional Law Project website Tschentscher (2009), national constitution websites, Ency-
clopaedia Britannica, the CIA World Fact Book, and www.rulers.org. As noted above, in
some cases this is a slightly subjective process. For example in the case of the UK, there
was no clear transition to democracy, but instead the franchise was slowly extended as
power was transferred from the aristocracy to democratically elected representatives.
Similar issues exist with countries that have no formal constitution, or in which the
constitution has been changed in a fundamental way subsequent to having become
a democracy. Facing such difﬁculties the most appropriate strategy is inevitably a
combination of using some a priori criteria whilst retaining an appreciation of the
idiosyncrasies of a given country’s transition to democracy.
The method used here is premised on the basis that a small degree of subjectivity
is more than compensated for by a more accurate picture than can be arrived at by
purely mechanistic methods. Consequently, when considering the date of a country’s
ﬁrst election the criteria sometimes vary. For a country such as Uganda the important16
criteria relate to the extent to which the election was free, fair, and pluralistic. Alterna-
tively, when considering the evolution of democracy in more established democracies
such as the USA or the UK, the salient issues are concerned with universal suffrage.12
Similarly, in countries which lack a written constitution, a judgement has to be made
as to when the country became democratic in a modern sense. For example, ancient
Athens would not qualify due to property, citizenship, and gender restrictions. In this
paper’s measure, the criteria for the date of ﬁrst democratic elections (dateelections)
were each considered to be a necessary condition and are as follows:
1. A country is considered to have held democratic elections if they were pluralist,
and not characterised by widespread voter-intimidation or ballot stufﬁng. In
most cases this is evident from the standard historical narratives for a given
country, however in some (particularly recent) cases the records of outside
election observers are required.
2. The elections were or are expected to be succeeded by further free elections at
regular intervals.
3. A country is considered to have held a democratic election if the franchise is
deﬁned by universal male suffrage. Whilst it is obviously not in any modern sense
“democratic” to have elections in which only around 50% of the adult population
may vote, the decision not to require universal suffrage was based upon a need
to preserve the richness inherent in the global history of democracy. Requiring
universal suffrage would have artiﬁcially compressed the data, implying that
almost every country that is now a democracy with a full franchise, held its ﬁrst
democratic election, at the earliest, at the start of the twentieth century.13
4. For the purpose of this paper, a country is only considered to have achieved the
democratic transition when there is no subsequent return to autocracy except
that imposed by short-term foreign invasion.
12This is because whilst the franchise was often extended slowly in many older democracies it is
increasingly rare for a newly democratic country to hold elections with a restricted franchise.
13This is perhaps the most controversial of the criteria, in part due to its logic following from a concern
for the sufﬁciency of the data rather than a standard democratic principle. In doing so it neglects an
important historical movement. But, if it were to focus on universal suffrage then in many respects it
wouldignoreinsteadthe, perhapsequal, importanceofthemyriadmovementsthatconstitutethehistory
of democratisation.17
Similarly for the date of constitution (dateconstitution):-
1. A country was considered to have a democratic constitution when it ﬁrst promul-
gated a constitution that provided for free and plural democratic elections.
2. The date of constitution refers to the ﬁrst democratic constitution that provided
for a structure of government broadly similar to that currently in force. There-
fore, in a parliamentary system, the promulgation of a new constitution or an
amendment to the current constitution is only seen as the ﬁrst constitution in
cases where the transition to the new constitution was characterised by martial
law, popular unrest, or military intervention.
3. The replacement of a monarch with an elected, but largely symbolic, president is
not consideredto represent areal change ineither the structureof government or
the advent of real democracy.
4. If several constitutions are promulgated and rapidly replaced as part of the
democratic transition then it is the ﬁnal (and current) one, which is considered
for the purposes of establishing the date of constitution. In reference to Criterion
Two, this means that a country that undergoes a period of political instability as
part of the democratic transition is not considered a democracy until it achieves
a workable constitution.
5. A constitution is only considered to date from the beginning of its current period
of continuous enforcement. Hence, ex-USSR countries which resurrected their
pre-WW2 constitutions are considered to have had a democratic constitution
since its promulgation date post-1989.
6. If a country lacks a speciﬁc written constitution, the date of the constitution will
refertowhenthespeciﬁcbodyoflawsgoverningthenatureofthepoliticalsystem
as it currently is were passed. However, if again there is no such speciﬁc body of
law, or its introduction is spread out over a long period then the constitution is
dated based upon when the elected representatives of the people ﬁrst became
legally politically pre-eminent.
The two variables that will be used in the analysis are mthelct and mthconst and
were obtained by transforming the dateelections and dateconstitution variables into18
a ﬁgure recording the number of months between the inception of democracy as
measured and the start of the year 2004.
It is useful to compare age, mthconst, and mthelct. It is clear from Figure 1 that
although there is a marked correlation between mthconst, mthelct, and age there
are also some notable discrepancies. This conclusion is reinforced by the following
correlations:
Variable age mthconst mthelct
age 1 0.78 0.89
mthconst 1 0.81
mthelct 1
And also these Spearman’s Rank coefﬁcients:
Variable age mthconst mthelct
age 1 0.74 0.89
mthconst 1 0.78
mthelct 1
Some examples of how these criteria were implemented and the most notable




using Fuller and CUE estimators and the new instrument set. Secondly, it will consider
the results obtained using the new measures of the the age of democracies. The results
suggest improved support for PT’s claims, with larger estimated coefﬁcients, limited
bias, and weak-instrument robust results. Of course, it is impossible to ever prove
robustness, rather the purpose of this section and generally this paper, is to address the19
key econometric and conceptual concerns discussed above. Results are reported using
both the original dataset of PT and the expanded data provided by Blume, M¨ oller, Voigt
and Wolf (2009), who provide data for larger set of democracies. These democracies
are in general more recent than those in the PT dataset, and include many that became
democracies subsequent to the early-1990s date for which PT’s data were created. On
the basis of this extended dataset they argue that PT’s consistent result of a negative
and statistically signiﬁcant OLS coefﬁcient on Pres becomes consistently positive.
Table 2 considers whether PT’s results are driven by their choice of a potentially
biased estimator. Column 1 reports results identical to those in PT using their
methodology for both their original sample, and the Blume et al. (2009) (henceforth,
the expanded sample). Columns 2 and 3 suggest that for this speciﬁcation, using
potentially invalid instruments, that the main consequence of using 2SLS or the Fuller
estimators is to increase the estimated coefﬁcient on Pres by around 30% to one and
one half standard deviations of the sample variance of cgexp. The Moreira (2003) weak-
instrument robust conﬁdence set (CCCS) suggests that the negative coefﬁcient on Pres
is indeed signiﬁcant, and that the coefﬁcient associated with Maj is not. Results using
the expanded data set are reported in Columns 4-8.14 The estimates of the effect
of Presidentialism for the expanded sample are slightly smaller, but not signiﬁcantly
so. The estimates obtained using the CUE are larger for both the PT sample and
the expanded sample.15 Indeed, a consistent result across all of the speciﬁcations
considered in this paper, is that the CUE consistently suggests a larger negative
coefﬁcient for Pres and higher t-statistics. This perhaps reﬂect the joint estimation of
the coefﬁcients and covariance matrix. Whilst, the results are consistently larger than
the Fuller estimates that they qualitatively similar and consistent across speciﬁcations
suggests the lack of ﬁnite-sample moments has not proved overly problematic. The
CCCS, is similar to the results obtained using other PT’s data although the p-value for
Pres falls to 0:01.
Whilst, the results of Table 2 suggest that PT’s choice of estimator if anything led
to them underestimating their impact of presidential democracy, Acemoglu (2005)’s
14A lack of data for engfrac and eurfrac is why the sample is smaller than the full Blume et al. (2009)
sample.
15CUE estimates corresponding to the speciﬁcation in columns 1-3 are not reported but the coefﬁcient
of Pres is estimated as  13:11 with standard error 5:2820
key criticism remains: the set of excluded instruments is unable to predict variation
in the form of democracy. Table 3 reports results using the improved set of excluded
instruments discussed in Section 1.1.. Column 1 limits the sample to that used by PT,
and in Table 2, to facilitate comparison with the previous estimates. The coefﬁcient
of Pres is similar to that obtained in Table 2, but one potential cause for concern is
that the F-statistic of the excluded instruments in the ﬁrst-stage is low. As discussed
above, formally, instruments can be considered weak when the matrix of instruments
is of reduced-rank, previous tests had a variety of limitations and often the the ﬁst
stage F-statistic was considered the best heuristic. However, Kleibergen and Paap
(2006) propose the ‘rk’ statistic which has a 2 limiting distribution and makes no
assumptions about the structure of the error terms. As well as providing a Wald-test
for whether the instruments are weak, a related LM test again following Kleibergen and
Paap (2006) (KP) tests whether the model is identiﬁed. These tests suggest that whilst
the new instruments are potentially weaker than those used by PT, as suggested by the
KP tests, the p-value that the model is under-identiﬁed is only 0:03 Interpretation of
the Wald statistics is based on the critical values tabulated in Stock and Yogo (2005),
they do not provide critical values for CUE estimates, but do for LIML and the use
of these seems reasonable both given that one interpretation of the CUE estimator is
the generalisation of LIML to the case of possible heteroscedasticity Hansen, Heaton
and Yaron (1996). Given the potential effects of weak instruments, inference requires
joint consideration of estimated coefﬁcients and their potential biases. Accordingly,
the remainder of this section will pay both equal attention.
As a benchmark, it is worth noting that the KP Wald statistics reported in Table
2 suggest we are only able to reject the hypotheses that the relative bias of the
2SLS estimates is greater than 30% and 20% for the PT and the expanded samples
respectively. The superior performance of the Fuller estimates is revealed by the fact
that we are able to reject relative biases greater than 10% and 5% respectively, for the
Fuller(1) estimators.
The performance of the new instruments, from the perspective of potential bias
due to weak-identiﬁcation is mixed. For the PT sample, only a maximum bias of 30%
cannot be rejected, whilst for the sample of all observations in the original PT dataset
the KP Wald-statistic associated with the Fuller estimators, fails to reach the necessary21
critical to reject even this level of bias. However, when the expanded sample is used,
that whilst the model is better identiﬁed for both the pre-1992 and full samples, there
is little robust evidence for an effect of presidentialism in full sample. Speciﬁcally, for
bothsamplesthemaximumbiasisnowestimatedas10%. But,theCCCSp-valueisnow
0:16 for the full-sample. That the estimated coefﬁcients are qualitatively smaller as well
suggest that the effect of presidentialism is smaller in more recent democracies. This
ﬁndingisconsistentwiththoseofBlumeetal.(2009). Smallerestimatesformorerecent
democracies are perhaps to be expected. If, as Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000)
argue, smaller governments in presidential democracies, is an equilibrium effect of the
separation of powers it is expected that the impact of constitutional type takes time
to emerge. This may be speciﬁcally due to the relative infrequency of budget-setting
and the large number of confounding factors.16 The CCCS estimates, suggest that this
is not just a consequence of weak identiﬁcation. Whilst, weak identiﬁcation could in
theory bias the estimated Fuller or CUE coefﬁcients downwards, the CCCS p-values are
correct for arbitrarily weak-identiﬁcation and suggest a lack of signiﬁcant effect in the
full sample.
To facilitate comparison, Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 correspond to columns 2 and
3 of Table 3. The results suggest that the choice of age measure has little impact on the
estimated coefﬁcients, perhaps increasing them slightly. This suggests that, despite its
limitations, the use of age is not driving the results. However, the estimated maximum
bias of the Fuller coefﬁcients is now smaller, suggesting that consistent with the overall
identiﬁcation strategy, that better measures of democratic age, predict pres and maj
better. Crucially, the rk Wald statistic is now sufﬁcient to reject bias of more than 20%
for the estimates employing mthelct and mthconst. The size test associated with the
CUE estimates suggests there is only a very minor improvement with a move from
15% to 10% of the maximal LIML size. This suggests that a 5% conﬁdence intervals of
pres would at worst correspond to a 10% conﬁdence interval. Equivalently, this means
that at worst the p-value of the CUE estimates would increase from 0:01 to 0:02, but in
general the estimates remain comfortably signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
16As Blume et al note, the average country in the expanded dataset has a higher Gastil (quality of
democracy) index, is more likely to be in Africa, is closer to the equator, and more likely to speak English.
They are also signiﬁcantly smaller, and more likely to be islands. Whether, it is differences in these
characteristics instead of their shorter history of democracy that accounts for the smaller impact of pres is
unclear.22
Columns 7 and 8 report results for an alternative sample that restricts the sample
to countries that became democracies prior to 1992 according to the two measures.
These are not a sub-sample of the APT countries, rather from the extended sample.
The results suggest a smaller impact of presidentialism for this sample, and the CCCS
only gives a p-value of around 0:05. The smaller estimated pres coefﬁcient is consistent
with the results obtained in columns 4-7 of Table 3 and that obtained in column 8 of
Table 2.
Overall, based on results obtained using a variety of samples, estimators, excluded
instrument sets, and measures of democratic age, the general ﬁnding must be that
there is indeed consistent evidence for a quantitatively large negative effect of presi-
dentialism on the size of government. A key exception is that there is no such result if
countries that became democracies after the early 1990s contained in the expanded
dataset of Blume et al. (2009) are included. Of central importance to the results
obtained is that both the CCCS and the kp-Wald test suggest that the results are not an
artefactofaweak-instrumentsproblem,whilsttheuseofthenewexcluded-instrument
set is motivated by the requirements of exogeneity as well as an ability to explain
differences between institutions.
Lessemphasishasbeenplacedontheresultsconcerningtheimpactofmajoritarian
elections (maj). This is in part because it was statistically insigniﬁcant in PT’s original
analyses and in no speciﬁcation considered here does that change. However, this is
not an argument for disregarding it, including maj as an exogenous variable gives
rise to signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcients, underlining the importance of treating it as
potentially endogenous, and giving it equal a priori importance, when choosing the
excluded instruments.
4. Conclusions
This paper has addressed three problems in the approach of PT: the use of a potentially
biased estimator, the irrelevance of the excluded instruments, and the weakness of
the measure of the age of democracies used. The ﬁrst two issues were raised by
Acemoglu (2005) and the Fuller and CUE estimators and an alternative instrument
set was proposed in response to his concerns. The results obtained with these new23
estimators and using the new instruments provide support for the conclusions of PT
thatpresidentialdemocraciesareassociatedwithsmallergovernmentsasapercentage
of GDP .
The paper also introduced two new measures of the inception of democracy. The
results obtained using these improved measures lend further credibility to the PT
results. However, it remains the case that no signiﬁcant relationship is identiﬁed for
an expanded dataset, when the sample includes countries that became democracies
subsequenttotheearly1990s. Iftheconsequencesofconstitutionstaketimetoemerge
then this might be expected. Other than these exceptions, the consistency in results
would suggest that the debate can only intensify as to whether Acemoglu (2005) is
correct when he claims PT have made ”the most signiﬁcant contribution to this ﬁeld
since Lipset’s work almost 50 years ago.”24
Table 1: Summary Statistics
N Mean Std Min Max
cgexp 84 28:28 10:53 9:74 51:18
pres 84 0:39 0:49 0:00 1:00
maj 84 0:42 0:50 0:00 1:00
lyp 83 8:44 0:99 6:27 9:94
trade 84 79:61 49:16 17:56 343:39
age 84 1:20 1:11 0:29 5:17
prop1564 83 61:44 5:88 49:05 71:70
prop65 83 7:85 4:88 2:30 17:43
gastil 84 2:38 1:20 1:00 4:89
federal 84 0:16 0:36 0:00 1:00
oecd 84 0:27 0:45 0:00 1:00
con2150 84 0:11 0:31 0:00 1:00
con5180 84 0:25 0:44 0:00 1:00
con81 84 0:44 0:50 0:00 1:00
lat01 84 0:31 0:19 0:00 0:71
engfrac 84 0:15 0:33 0:00 1:00
eurfrac 84 0:40 0:44 0:00 1:00
coluka 84 0:32 0:41 0:00 0:93
colespa 84 0:07 0:15 0:00 0:79
excolony 84 0:62 0:49 0:00 1:00
mthconst 76 1:08 1:03 0:13 4:58
mthconst2 76 2:21 4:15 0:02 21:01
mthelct 76 1:09 1:02 0:13 4:26
mthelct2 76 2:21 4:15 0:02 21:01
mm 76 0:57 0:51 0:09 2:09

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Scatter plots comparing age, mthconst, and mthelct
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